Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis

Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development
In the past three years, the Horn of Africa has been characterised by keen diplomatic activities and advanced processes of mediation. To end Africa's oldest war, representatives of the Sudanese government began negotiations in Machakos (Kenya) with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan's most important rebel movement. Kenya is also hosting peace talks to set up a new Somali government; participants include the Transitional National Government (TNG) first set up in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000, numerous warlords who were excluded from the Arta process, and local politicians and tribal elders of every shade of opinion. And finally, an international commission in April 2002 made public a decision regarding the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highly contentious issue; thus a mechanism to manage conflict through arbitration was applied. It was agreed upon in the Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000. But demarcation remains to be done and is contested by Ethiopia. In view of these diverse efforts, is there hope that sustainable peace will be achieved in the Horn of Africa? Or is there reason to be more sceptical, considering that peace processes have failed for decades and that different conflicting parties have indulged repeatedly in numerous disruptive activities? We will look into these questions by reviewing the three large complexes of war and conflict mentioned above, well in the knowledge that they are just a cross-section of an overall situation in the Horn of Africa characterised by protracted armed conflicts. Particular attention will be given to structural features of peace processes which we regard as decisive for their sustainability. These encompass:
o the issue of inclusiveness of the process, involving all relevant conflict parties and Finally, we will briefly compare and evaluate the insights gathered from these considerations.
From Hot War To Cold Peace -The Apparent Regulation Of The Conflict Between Ethiopia And Eritrea
When Ethiopia's Mengistu regime, long supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, collapsed in 1991, great and justified hope arose that there would be a new start. The two most important rebel movements, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), had swept away a regime that had degenerated into tyranny. The rebel movements also intended to set up an Ethiopian federation, or at least a programme for such. Not least importantly, their "brotherhood of arms" was based on an agreement that the people of Eritrea would be able to decide for themselves whether they would exercise their right of self-determination within Ethiopia or within an independent state, something they had been fighting for since September 1961 (Péninou 2000) .
Historical Background, The Course Of War And Its End
As expected, Eritrea in 1993 decided in favour of independence. However, the deeply rooted conflict over domination and self-determination in the Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship had been settled only in accordance with international law. The border conflict that escalated into widespread war in 1998, was a situation difficult for outsiders to understand and showed how tense their relationship remained. In battles between May 1998 and June 2000, as many as 100,000 people died and some 1.2 million people were driven from their homelands (Mengistu 2001: 9) .
The starting point of extensive conflict was Badme, a border village claimed by both sides (Iyob 2000 and Brüne/Heinrich 2000) . A bilateral commission had not been successful in settling this border issue by 1998 because there were deep-seated and unresolved differences in opinion and rivalries between the powerful elites of both countries. When Eritrea introduced its own currency, the Nakfa, it documented its will to completely separate itself from Ethiopia -a move that was taken as an affront by many in Addis Ababa. Economic relations became deadlocked. No agreement could be reached on conditions for bilateral trade (currency conversion) or investment conditions for Eritreans in Ethiopia (Iyob 2000: 674;  Gebre Mariam/Kassa 2001: 67) . Finally, the fact that Ethiopia was highly dependent on the port of Assab in Eritrea for access to the sea was a psychologically and politically sensitive issue (Mengistu 2001: 10) . Because Assab can't be used at present, Ethiopia is now highly dependent on harbour facilities in Djibouti. This leaves the country and its 65 million inhabitants in a vulnerable position (Mengistu 2001: 10) . No less importantly, the rapid and fierce escalation of war had to do with unresolved claims to supremacy. While Ethiopia, also vis-à-vis Eritrea, sees itself as the region's dominant power because of its geographical position, size and history, the self-image of Eritrea's leadership is still stamped by its victory over Mengistu and the military superiority of the EPLF over the TPLF at that time.
American shuttle diplomacy, exerted directly after the conflict broke out, at first failed.
Pride and stubbornness dominated on both sides. The Eritrean side in particular thwarted finding a solution during this phase -not least because the U.S. suggested that Eritrea withdraw its troops. Only after Ethiopia had carried out several massive offences did President Issayas Afeworki gradually give way and become receptive to a process of negotiation (Gebre Mariam/Kassa 2001: 71) . In view of Ethiopia's far-reaching conquests, some observers even thought Eritrea's independence was threatened (see Lortan 2000: 6;  Gilkes/Plaut 2000), especially because calls to "reconquer" Assab became louder within Ethiopia (Plaut 2001: 129) .
In a cease-fire agreement signed in Algiers on 18 June 2000, Eritrea's leadership forestalled capitulation and was able to "save what could be saved". In December 2000, the warring parties concluded the Algiers Peace Agreements under the patronage of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU)
1 . The U.S. and Algeria acted as signatory powers (Péninou 2001 
"Power Mediation" And Domestic Obstacles To Implementation
Important outside actors (U.S., European Union, United Nations, OAU and IGAD (InterGovernmental Authority on Development)) were able to reach agreement on a broad consensual basis during the mediation process and thus largely avoided the turf wars amongst mediators that often prevail in such processes (Prendergast 2001: 1 and 4) . Beyond this multilateral action, the U.S. played a crucial role as the driving force behind the scenes, closely accompanying the OAU mediation process led officially by Algeria. Even before 11
September 2001, U.S. foreign policy had focused increasingly on the latent threat of Islamic fundamentalism emerging from Sudan and Somalia in particular. In this context, Ethiopia was seen as a stronghold of Christianity and sometimes as a hegemonic power -a premise of American policy on Africa which gained importance within the framework of the global war on terror. To Eritrea, the U.S. attached important strategic significance because of its location on the Red Sea. The war endangered these ideas and at the same time strengthened movements for secession and extremist groups in the two countries. (Gilkes/Plaut 2000: 2) .
Eritrea was reported to have provided arms and military training to Oromo and Ogaden opposition movements and ostensibly to Al-Ittihad in Ethiopia. The Somali warlord Hussein Aideed, today often an ally, then still an "arch enemy" of Ethiopia (and the U.S.), is supposed to have brokered such supplies (Gilkes 1999) . At the same time, Addis Ababa and the internationally isolated government in Khartoum, led by the National Islamic Front (NIF), surprisingly moved closer together (Lortan 2000: 7) .
Within this complex situation, the U.S. was oriented towards a settlement between Eritrea and Ethiopia and did not want to take sides; at first no sanctions were levied (Kelley 2003) .
Although the U.S. quietly initiated its own weapons embargo, a comprehensive UN embargo only came into being two weeks before the war ended, and after both warring factions had The mediation process itself concentrated on the countries' elite -societal actors and opposition forces were ignored. This design had many advantages since it was clear and relatively uncomplicated for applying classic diplomacy. But a central disadvantage was that the peace process was handled and seen as a clandestine, almost private matter between rulers (as the war had been before that). The war's origin, the course it took and its human losses remained inscrutable. Neither civil society nor opposition forces were involved into a process of mutual recognition or even reconciliation 3 .
An inherent danger exists of analysing the war and the peace process within classical categories of international conflict and disregarding core domestic aspects. Eritrea on its part has rejected dialogue with Ethiopia before demarcation has taken place.
The government in Asmara refused to receive the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy (and former Canadian Foreign Minister) Lloyd Axworthy because it is not willing to accept any mechanism that could be considered an alternative to the boundary ruling and its implementation.
While the military situation appears relatively stable and calm, the political stalemate involves the risk of unforeseen escalation. Although the potential for escalation on the Eritrean side is lower in view of its lesser military capacity and its relatively isolated international position, its increasingly repressive regime is certainly capable of diversionary tactics in foreign policy and sudden, seemingly irrational acts. The Ethiopian government for its part seems to be resolved to postpone settlement of the conflict to the post-Issayas era and is therefore particularly keen on regime change in Asmara. Reports keep surfacing that each government supports opposition movements in the rival country.
One special worry regarding the implementation of the peace process and political developments is that the war set back already waning and often superficial reform processes in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Initial attempts to liberalise political life and balance the power of the ruling elite are always difficult during wartime and post-war periods. The war revitalised and strengthened an already existing "military legacy" of leading groups that had gained power through decades of conflict. It is precisely this legacy that is in the way of lasting peace and urgently needed reform.
Oil, September 11, And Massive U.S. Involvement -New Opportunities For Sudan?
Sudan has been characterised by war for nearly half a century -with some interruptions.
Politically, the central issue is the self-determination of the south, where in contrast to the 
The Second Sudan War (Since 1983) -Background, Parties To Conflict And The Course Of War
In 1983, armed conflict broke out again; it has since cost the lives of more than two million people (Heinrich 2002 (Heinrich : 1051 . As the predominant rebel organisation, the Sudan People . In an independent "new South Sudan", they would be minorities compared to the SPLM, which is predominantly Dinka (Dhuor 2003) . For this reason, these southern factions advocate a unified Sudan. Moreover, for payment they help the Khartoum government expel people and protect the oil infrastructure. The SPLA in fact controls rural areas and some towns in the south, whereas the government defends its garrison towns and, indirectly, territories controlled by militias, especially in oil producing regions. In contrast to the SPLA, it has an air force, which it has used in the past repeatedly against the civilian population and aid organisation facilities. In spite of the war's changeable course, fighting is bogged down in positional warfare.
Starting in 1998, the exploration and export of oil from the border region between north and south became a dynamic element in the situation. Oil reserves, estimated at two billion barrels, lie mostly in southern Sudan and along the internal boundary. The regime receives an income of one million dollars a day from the oil business and thus has the potential to turn the military stalemate around to its own advantage by purchasing weapons and financing militias. 
The IGAD Peace Process -From The 1994 Declaration Of Principles To The 2002 Machakos Protocol
Since 1989, various mediators and actors have participated again and again in peace talks 5 .
An important milestone was the Declaration of Principles 6 formulated in 1994 as a result of mediation through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).
The declaration establishes that lasting peace cannot be achieved militarily. The southern Sudanese population is entitled to the right to determine its future in a referendum. However, common wealth (particularly state income), human rights and an independent system of justice.
The Sudanese government has repeatedly evaded enforcing the document; strikingly, the regime did not even accept it until 1997 (Heinrich 2002 (Heinrich : 1051 . The SPLA has also shown limited interest in peace. In view of the support the movement receives from the U.S., and its control over territories, aid supplies and large segments of the population in southern Sudan, the SPLA has only to a limited extent been motivated to seek peace. This bogged down situation did not change until a global upheaval took place -the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing U.S.-led "war on terror". All of a sudden, Sudan was at the top of the American foreign policy and security agenda. The U.S. had already shown itself ready for military action in 1998 when, after U.S. embassies were bombed in Tanzania and Kenya, U.S.
armed forces fired cruise missiles at a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory because of its alleged production of chemical weapons.
The El-Bashir regime, which has been subject to American economic sanctions since 1997, At the end of September, a further breakthrough was achieved through the agreement on security arrangements for the interim period. It is planned that SPLA and government forces remain in existence separately, withdrawing to the south and north respectively, while "joint/ Blue Nile Province, along the internal border could be signed so far. There seems to be consensus that the aforementioned areas shall be autonomous in the transition phase but it is a highly controversial question whether all the three regions shall have the right to participate in the planned referendum in six-and-a-half years (AP 29.06.2003) . The SPLM further demands that Abyei, totally ignored in September's security agreement, shall be allocated to the south.
3) Despite the principal ruling by the Machakos Protocol, it remains unclear which law shall be adopted in the national capital. While the government wants to apply Shari'a jurisdiction like in the Northern areas, the SPLM insists that at least the predominantly Christian parts of the capital shall be exempted from such jurisdiction.
In addition, all of the agreements signed so far are characterised by huge gaps and loopholes. Addressing these deficits after the formal signing of the framework agreement will involve further delay and potential for breakdown.
Moreover, since spring 2003, a disregarded conflict has profoundly escalated in parallel to the peace talks. In the Darfur Province, in West Sudan, the "Sudan Liberation Army" and the "Justice and Equality Movement" have been involved in fierce fighting with government troops and in particular with militia loyal to the government, displacing about a million people (BBC; 30.04.2004) . In contrast to its stated will to achieve peace in Machakos, the Sudanese government for a long time exclusively followed a strategy of military repression in this case.
Chad, hosting 100,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur, after repeated failures, succeeded in May 2004 to kick off a mediation process for Darfur. However, worries remain that the Darfur conflict could be used to further prolong the Southern negotiations.
Since October 2003, fighting between government-backed Nuer and Shilluk militias and the SPLA has displaced at least 25,000 people in the area of Malakal. This followed the re-defection of Lam Akol's Nuer-focused faction to Garang's Dinka-focused SPLA-united, a move that was not welcomed by all militia in the area.
Mediators are exerting great pressure to push the Sudanese peace process forward. Though pressure is certainly needed, there is a danger that the parties will eventually be pushed into signing a peace agreement although they do not support its contents, or that unresolved points of contention are only being shifted to the next phase of the process. There seems to be a given "road map", but no one knows what the destination of the journey is. In this connection, it is particularly noticeable that there is no plan for transforming politics and society in Sudan.
Especially in this regard, the negotiation design could prove to be counterproductive in the If Sudan is supposed to develop into a constitutional state founded on the rule of law, the northern Sudanese opposition ought to be integrated into the peace process as well. But at the moment, it is only there as an onlooker. For good reason, the northern secular opposition could hardly give its support to cementing sharia law through the Machakos peace deal. In the south as well, the process has not been validated by democratic participation, and the SPLM has considerably strengthened its political control in recent years by setting up a civil administration. Moreover, the Machakos Protocol more or less ensures the SPLM a six-year monopoly of power in the south that it could abuse in conflicts between the dominant Dinka and southern ethnic minorities (Heinrich 2002 (Heinrich : 1052 ).
Not least, one problem in implementing a possible treaty is that current negotiating partners do not include militia loyal to the government or southern factions that are independent of the SPLA. The exclusion of militias gives the government the means to torpedo the peace process militarily if necessary, without being made responsible for such activity. Besides, militias can potentially disrupt proceedings if they are not sitting at the negotiation 
War, Disintegration Of The State And Local Success Stories -Somalia In The 1990s
At the end of the 1980s, it became obvious that state and nation-building in Somalia had 
The Arta Process, The Ethiopian Role And Peace Negotiations In Eldoret
Continuing attempts to create a national transitional government for Somalia failed during the second half of the 1990s, not least because of regional rivalries such as that between Ethiopia and Egypt. In 1999, Djibouti undertook an internationally concerted initiative. Within the framework of IGAD, a large meeting was held in the city of Arta, supported by Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, the Gulf states and others. Participants were hundreds of traditional elders, a few warlords and several political leaders, some of whom were former government politicians Warlords' calculations and the composition of participants at Mbagathi both give rise to doubts on the sustainability of agreements, should they be accomplished. First, the integration of civil actors during negotiations is insufficient, but also ambivalent and difficult. The precise contours of future institutional arrangements, lying at the heart of a peace solution, in the end remain either shadowy or are fiercely disputed. Under the given conditions of a strongly segmented society, a federal structure appears appropriate, built on existing local and regional units. But such "building blocks" would first have to be consolidated and fostered so that they can become a solid foundation for building a nation and earning at least partial legitimacy. Instead, the present model seems to be set for a hierarchical central government and, if any, a top-down integration of existing structures regardless of their dubiousness in reality. As in past Somali history, such a "state from above" would likely remain a very fragile, externally dependent and empty apparatus at the service of client networks, floating over society like a balloon (see Heyer 1997) .
Conclusion
Are hopes justified that various processes for mediating and regulating conflicts in the Horn of Africa will lead to sustainable peace? The above analysis suggests there is more reason to be sceptical than optimistic. Three problems must be looked at closely. 1) Although some mediation and negotiation processes were and still are set up entirely correctly, they have weaknesses based on dilemmas that are not easy to resolve.
Classical diplomacy was used during the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, leading to a late success two years after war began and theoretically paving the way for dealing formally with the border dispute. But the Algiers agreements neither created options for transferring the -partly unexpected -outcomes of the peace deal to the internal political realities, nor did it take into account the level of domestic societies (particularly along the border) or manage the underlying tension surrounding the border dispute between both countries. In addition, the overall focus of international actors on Islamic threats diverts their attention from the real challenge, which is to politically and economically transform both countries, which had been thought to be hope-bearers at the beginning of the 1990s.
2) The difficulty of the plans for mediation in Sudan and Somalia is, on the one hand, to gather all important political actors with power at one table, and on the other hand, to
give civil society and the political opposition opportunities for control and transparency. The typical diversity of conflicting parties and stakeholders needed for such inclusiveness can make negotiations much more difficult. At the same time, excluding important actors takes its toll during the implementation phase -a point that
still seems largely open in the case of Sudan.
3) All three conflicts discussed here lack perspectives that point the way ahead to sustainable arrangements that turn warring parties into cooperation partners.
Regulations must still be found to govern core issues in bilateral economic relations (conversion of currency, freedom to invest, and use of harbours) between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In addition, the Horn of Africa does not have an effective anti-destabilisation regime. Almost as a matter of course, countries support rebel groups and opposition movements in neighbouring countries, giving rise to expectations of clashes and even violent coups. IGAD would be a suitable framework for developing principles, standards, regulations and mechanisms that would stop such activity, but it is hampered by internal divisions, structural flaws and, fundamentally, political will of member states.
Negotiations involving Sudan and Somalia bear the danger that sensitive questions of nation-building and territorial self-determination (even as far as secession) are avoided by entering into short-or mid-term compromises for the sake of coming to any agreement. It thus seems that the solution under consideration for Sudan, which would allow different systems of law to coexist within the framework of a "one-state solution", is highly problematic. Moreover, independence for south Sudan can be a sensible option only if possibilities for an "amicable divorce" are carefully delineated before a referendum takes place. In the case of Somalia, the legitimacy and shaping of existing and future power and government structures is an unresolved key question. An depend on whether these activities are only a short-winded effort in the "war against terrorism" or encompass a longer-term commitment to regional stability.
